In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomatized the well-known Shapley value as the unique one-point solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity, and associated consistency. The purpose of this paper is to extend Hamiache's axiomatization to the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important representative. For this enlarged class of values, explicit relationships to the Shapley value are exploited in order to axiomatize such values with reference to a slightly adapted inessential game property, continuity, and a similar associated consistency. The latter axiom requires that the solutions of the initial game and its associated game (with the same player set, but a different characteristic function) coincide.
Introduction and notions
Formally, a transferable utility game (or cooperative game or coalitional game with side payments) is a pair N, v , where N is a finite set of at least two players and v : 2 N → R is a characteristic function satisfying v(∅) = 0. An element of N (notation: i ∈ N ) and a nonempty subset S of N (notation: S ⊆ N or S ∈ 2 N with S = ∅) is called a player and coalition respectively, and the real number v(S) is called the worth of coalition S. The size (cardinality) of coalition S is denoted by |S| or, if no ambiguity is possible, by s. Particularly, n denotes the size of the player set N . Let G denote the universal game space consisting of all TU-games. A TU-game N, v is called superadditive if v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅. The solution part of cooperative game theory deals with the allocation problem of how to divide, for any TU-game N, v . the overall earnings the amount of v(N ) among the players. In conformity with the traditional one-point solution part, with every TU-game is associated a single allocation called the value of the TU-game. Formally, a value on G is a function Φ that assigns a single payoff vector Φ(N, v) = (Φ i (N, v)) i∈N ∈ R N to every TU-game N, v ∈ G.
The so-called value Φ i (N, v) of player i in the game N, v represents an assessment by i of his gains for participating in the game. Without going into details, we recall the well-known Shapley value Sh(N, v) = (Sh i (N, v)) i∈N ∈ R N as follows ( [6] , [4] , [1] The eldest axiomatization of the Shapley value is stated in 1953 by Shapley himself [6] by referring to four properties called efficiency, symmetry, linearity, and dummy player property.
The most recent axiomatization of the Shapley value is stated in 2001 by Hamiache [2] who proposed a new set of axioms called the inessential game property, continuity, and associated consistency. The purpose of this paper is to extend Hamiache's axiomatization to the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important representative. For this enlarged class of values, explicit relationships to the Shapley value will be exploited in order to axiomatize such values by referring to a slightly adapted inessential game property, continuity, and a similar associated consistency. Concerning values for TUgames, firstly let us review several properties treated in former axiomatizations of the Shapley value and secondly, we recall four equivalent interpretations of the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values. Definition 1.1. A value Φ on the universal game space G possesses
for all games N, v , all i ∈ N , and every permutation π on N . Here the game N, πv is defined by (πv)(πS) := v(S) for all S ⊆ N ;
for all games N, v , N, w , and all α ∈ R, β ∈ R. Here the game
(v) continuity, if for any (pointwise) convergent sequence of games { N, v m } ∞ m=0 , say the limit of which is the game N,ṽ , the corresponding sequence of values {Φ(N, v m )} ∞ m=0 converges to the value Φ(N,ṽ).
Throughout this paper we deal with two adaptations of games. The first adaptation of a given game N, v concerns the following optimistic self-evaluation by coalitions. Every coalition S evaluates its own worth v Sh λ (S) in the associated game N, v Sh λ as the sum of its initial worth v(S) and a percentage λ ∈ [0, 1] of all possible surpluses v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S) − v({j}) arising from mutual cooperation (instead of non-cooperation) among the coalition S itself and any of each non-members j ∈ N \S. 1 For superadditive games N, v , we have v Sh λ (S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N , while v Sh λ (S) = v(S) for inessential games N, v . Further, the worth of the grand coalition N does not change under this adaptation, i.e., v Sh λ (N ) = v(N ). The associated consistency requires that the value is invariant under the adaptation of the game into its associated game. Because payoffs to players neither increase nor decrease, there are not adverse effects of such optimistic self-evaluations by coalitions. 
(ii) A value Φ on G possesses associated consistency with respect to the associated game of
The second adaptation of a game concerns a check of credibility of the characteristic function by an independent arbiter. The task of the arbiter is to perform a scaling procedure by taking into account the sizes of both the player set and the coalition (but not the coalition itself). That is, for every coalition S ⊆ N , its initial worth v(S) will be scaled down or up to b n s · v(S) by some non-negative scaling number b n s ≥ 0, where s denotes the cardinality of coalition S. For example, if b n s = 1 s , then the scaling procedure involves averaging the worth of any coalition, different from the grand coalition N . By convention, b n n = 1 for the sake of efficiency invariance expressed by the invariant worth of the grand coalition. Throughout the remainder of the paper, let N = {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .} denote the set of all natural numbers and let B = {b n s | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n} denote a collection of non-negative scaling constants with b n n = 1 for all n ≥ 2. No scaling at all is expressed by the collection U of unit constants (equal to one). In view of the explicit formula (1.1), it follows immediately that the Shapley value possesses the inessential game property and continuity as well, whereas some non-trivial calculations are necessary to verify the associated consistency of the Shapley value with respect to the associated game of (1.2), that is Sh(N, v Sh λ ) = Sh(N, v) for all games N, v , and all λ ∈ [0, 1]. In fact, the main theorem in Hamiache ( [2] , page 282) states that the Shapley value is the unique value verifying the inessential game property, continuity, and associated consistency with respect to the associated game of (1.2) (provided 0 < λ < 2 n ). The uniqueness proof is rather tough and full of combinatorial calculations. In the remainder we aim to develop a similar axiomatization for any efficient, symmetric, and linear value. The explicit relationship between the Shapley value and any efficient, symmetric, and linear value is listed in the following fundamental theorem. One out of four equivalent statements refers to the adaptation of the game into its B-scaled game. (ii) There exists a (unique) collection of constants {ρ n s | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1} such that, for every n-person game N, v with at least two players, the value payoff vector (ψ i (N, v)) i∈N ∈ R N is of the following form ( [5] , Lemma 9, page 117): for all
(iii) There exists a (unique) collection of constants B = {b n s | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n} with b n n := 1 such that, for every n-person game N, v with at least two players, the value payoff vector (ψ i (N, v)) i∈N ∈ R N is of the following form:
(iv) There exists a (unique) collection of constants B = {b n s | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n} with b n n := 1 such that ψ(N, v) = Sh(N, Bv) for every game N, v with at least two players, i.e.,
(1.5)
It is left to the reader to verify, by straightforward computations, that the expression at the right hand of (1.3) agrees with the one at the right hand of (1.4) by choosing b n s = n s · ρ n s for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1}. Whenever b n s = 1 for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the expression at the right hand of (1.4) reduces to the Shapley value payoff (1.1) of player i in the n-person game N, v itself, that is ψ = Sh. Generally speaking, in view of (1.1), the right hand of (1.4) equals the Shapley value payoff Sh i (N, Bv) of player i in the B-scaled game N, Bv . In summary, the Equivalence Theorem 1.4 states that a value ψ is efficient, symmetric, and linear if and only if the ψ-value of a game coincides with the Shapley value of the B-scaled game. Throughout the development of the new theory and the forthcoming proofs we prefer to make use of the equality ψ(N, v) = Sh(N, Bv) among value payoff vectors. 
It is easy to verify that the EN SC-value is an efficient, symmetric, and linear value and in fact, its corresponding collection B = {b n s } of scaling constants is given by b n n = 1, b n n−1 = n−1, and b n s = 0 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 2. By Equivalence Theorem 1.4, EN SC(N, v) = Sh(N, Bv) for all games N, v . Definition 1.6. Let B = {b n s } be a collection of non-negative scaling constants with b n n = 1 for all n ≥ 2. 
In words, a game is B-inessential if it is decomposable as a product of an inessential game (associated with some vector x ∈ R N ) and a specific B-symmetric game. For example, the game N, v with characteristic function v(S) = |S| 2 for all S N , and v(N ) = |N |, is B-inessential with respect to the averaging collection of constants b n s = 1 s . Generally speaking, for arbitrary positive numbers α and p, the game N, v with characteristic function v(S) = α · |S| p for all S N , and v(N ) = α · |N |, is B-inessential with respect to the collection of constants b n s = s 1−p . We conclude this section with the claim that any efficient, symmetric, and linear value ψ on G satisfies the B-inessential game property, provided the collection of non-negative constants B corresponds to ψ through (1.5). Indeed, by applying the equivalence (1.5) and the well-known inessential game property for the Shapley value, applied to the B-scaled game, respectively, it follows that ψ i (N, v) = Sh i (N, Bv) = (Bv)({i}) = b n 1 ·v({i}) for all B-inessential games N, v , and all i ∈ N . For example, the EN SC-value satisfies the B-inessential game property, where the scaling constants are zero, except for b n n = 1, b n n−1 = n − 1.
Extended associated consistency
Recall that an independent arbiter is supposed to scale down or up any game through a collection of non-negative scaling constants B. Incorporating this scaling procedure, the Bassociated game is meant to represent the optimistic self-evaluation by coalitions, mathematically expressed as the associated game of the scaled version of the initial game. Throughout this section let B = {b n s } be a collection of positive scaling constants with b n n = 1 for all n ≥ 2.
Definition 2.1. Let U denote the collection of unit constants (equal to one). 
(ii) Particularly, for all games N, w , all λ ∈ [0, 1], and all S ⊆ N , S = ∅,
(iii) A value Φ on G possesses B-associated consistency with respect to the B-associated game of (2. 
Alternatively, it turns out that the B-scaling operator and the two associated game operators with reference to the two collections of scaling constants B and U generate a commutative diagram. The scaling procedure requires a collection of positive scaling constants B since zero constants may cause problems for the B-associated game to be well-defined. For example, in the setting of the EN SC-value, its corresponding collection of scaling constants B = {b n s } is given by b n n = 1, b n n−1 = n − 1, and b n s = 0 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 2. Consequently, (2.1) is not solvable for v B λ (S) with |S| = n − 2 due to b n n−2 = 0, b n 1 = 0, whereas b n n−1 = 0.
Remark 2.2. We provide an algebraic interpretation of the B-associated game N, v B λ of (2.1) through a matrix analysis. Fix the player set N of size n, write m = 2 n − 1, and let λ ∈ [0, 1]. According to the matrix approach, any game N, v is identified with its column vector v = (v(S)) S∈2 N \{∅} ∈ R m of the worth of all coalitions ordered in the traditional manner (e.g., the singletons at the top). In this vector-matrix setting, the description (2.1) of the characteristic function v U λ of the standard associated game may be interpreted as the matrix-vector equation λ . To conclude with, the "similarity" representation v B λ = (B −1 · M λ · B) · v for the B-associated game is rather common in matrix theory and provides another motivation to study these concepts. The matrix analysis of the B-associated game, however, is beyond the scope of this paper, but is a main topic for further research on B-associated consistency. (ii) ψ satisfies the B-inessential game property.
(iii) ψ satisfies continuity.
PROOF.
(i) By applying the Equivalence Theorem to the value ψ twice, the game equality (2.2), and the U-associated consistency for the Shapley value ( [2] , page 282) applied to the B-scaled game, respectively, it follows for all games N, v ∈ G, and all λ ∈ [0, 1],
This proves B-associated consistency for ψ, whereas the B-inessential game property for ψ was already proven at the end of the previous section. (iii) Finally, continuity for ψ holds because the Shapley value satisfies continuity. Given any (pointwise) convergent sequence of games { N, v k } ∞ k=0 , say the limit of which is the game N,ṽ , the sequence of B-scaled games { N, B(v k ) } ∞ k=0 converges too, the limit of which is the B-scaled game N, Bṽ . Consequently, the corresponding sequence of Shapley values {Sh(N, B(v k ))} ∞ k=0 converges to the Shapley value Sh(N, Bṽ), or equivalently, the corresponding sequence of values {ψ(N, v k )} ∞ k=0 converges to the value ψ(N,ṽ). 2
Now we are able to state our main result concerning an axiomatic characterization of any efficient, symmetric, and linear value. The remaining uniqueness part of its proof will be treated in the next section.
Theorem 2.4. Let B be a collection of positive scaling constants. There exists a unique value Φ on G verifying the B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-associated consistency with respect to the B-associated game of (2.1) (provided 0 < λ < We distinguish two tasks. The first task concerns the study of these game representations (3.1) in order to present an interrelationship between two game representations switching from an arbitrary collection of constants B to the standard collection of unit constants U. The forthcoming interrelationship (3.2) is rather appealing since it takes into account only the quotient of two constants from the collection B. As an adjunct, we derive the extended version of (2.2) in that the B-scaled game of the m-repeated B-associated game equals the m-repeated standard associated game of the B-scaled game, that is B(v m * B ) = (Bv) m * U . The two proofs are independent from Hamiache's work in the setting of the Shapley value. The second task concerns the study of convergence of any sequence {γ S m,B (T )} ∞ m=1 , for fixed coalitions S, T . Due to the completion of the first task, the former sequence converges if and only if the standard sequence {γ S m,U (T )} ∞ m=1 converges, which convergence problems has been completely solved in Hamiache's work [2] . Nevertheless, since the outcomes of these convergent sequences are slightly different, it is necessary to present the last stage of a slightly adapted proof of uniqueness. PROOF. Let N, v ∈ G. The proof of (3.2) is rather technical (proceeding by induction on m ≥ 1) and will be postponed till the appendix. However, (3.2) as well as the game representation (3.1) are helpful to establish the proof of the latter game equality
Hamiache's results 5 and 6 ([2], page 285) state that, for all coalitions S and T , the standard sequence {γ S m,U (T )} ∞ m=1 converges provided 0 < λ < 2 n (the proof of result 6 is rather complex). Hence, by (3.2), for all coalitions S, T , and all collections of positive constants B, the induced sequence {γ S m,B (T )} ∞ m=1 converges too, the limit of which is denoted byγ S B (T ). Define the limit game N,ṽ B bỹ
By (3.1), the sequence of repeated B-associated games { N, v m * B } ∞ m=1 converges (pointwise) to the limit game N,ṽ B . For any value Φ satisfying continuity, the corresponding sequence of values {Φ(N, v m * B )} ∞ m=1 converges to the value Φ (N,ṽ B ) . If, in addition, the value Φ satisfies B-associated consistency, then Φ(N, v m * B ) = Φ(N, v) for all m ∈ N. Hence, by convergence, Φ (N,ṽ B ) = Φ(N, v) . In the setting of the standard collection with unit constants U, Hamiache's result 8 ( [2] , page 288) states that the limit game N,ṽ U is an inessential game. In our current framework with reference to an arbitrary collection of positive constants B, we claim that the limit game N,ṽ B is B-inessential, that is the B-scaled game N, B(ṽ B ) is inessential. The proof of the fundamental claim will be based on the following convergence results taken from Hamiache's former work. 
Corollary 3.4. Let 0 < λ < 2 n , and S ⊆ N , S = ∅, and T ⊆ N , T = ∅. Then
(3.10)
Notice that (3.7) follows immediately from (3.2) by convergence and in turn, (3.8)-(3.10) are direct restatements of (3.4)-(3.6) of Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.5. Let N, v ∈ G and 0 < λ < 2 n . Then the following holds:
The technical proof of Theorem 3.5 is postponed till the appendix.
PROOF of the uniqueness part of Theorem 2.4. Parts (i) and (iii) of Theorem 3.5 are the remaining tools to complete the uniqueness part of the axiomatic characterization listed in Theorem 2.4 with reference to a given collection of positive scaling constants B. Suppose a value Φ on the game universal space G possesses the B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-associated consistency with respect to the B-associated game of (2.1). Let N, v ∈ G. As shown in the paragraph above Theorem 3.3, the latter two axioms imply the value equality Φ(N,ṽ B ) = Φ(N, v). By Theorem 3.5(i), the limit game N,ṽ B is B-inessential and thus, from the B-inessential game property for Φ we derive the following: 
Concluding remarks
In order to apply Theorem 2.4 to some subclasses of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, we discuss the class of least square values, which, in turn, includes the additive efficient normalization of any semi-value.
Example 4.1. The solidarity value Sol(N, v) of a game N, v is defined by some expected average marginal contribution over all coalitions containing the player as follows [3] :
It is known that the solidarity value is an efficient, symmetric, and linear value and in fact, its corresponding collection of scaling constants B = {b n s } is given by b n s = 1 s+1 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n−1 with b n n = 1. By Theorem 2.4, the solidarity value is the unique value Φ on G verifying the B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-associated consistency with respect to the B-associated game N, v B λ of (2.1) defined by v B λ (∅) := 0 and for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅,
Example 4.2. Let P = {p n s | n ∈ N\{0}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n} be a (yet unspecified) collection of probability distributions satisfying the normalization condition n s=1 n−1 s−1 · p n s = 1 and the inverse Pascal triangle conditions p n−1 s = p n s + p n s+1 for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1}, all n ≥ 2. For all games N, v ∈ G, let the corresponding semi-value SE P (N, v) and its additive efficient normalization ESE P (N, v) be defined as follows ([5] , pages 119-120):
and
Clearly, the additive efficient normalization satisfies efficiency and inherits linearity and symmetry from its underlying semi-value. Consequently, the additive efficient normalization of any semi-value is an efficient, symmetric, and linear value and in fact, its corresponding collection of scaling constants B = {b n s } is given by b n s = s · n−1 s
for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1 with b n n = 1 for all n ≥ 2. By Theorem 2.4, for any collection of positive probability distributions P, the additive efficient normalization ESE P of the underlying semi-value SE P is the unique value Φ on G verifying the B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-associated consistency with respect to the B-associated game N, v B λ of (2.1). Clearly, the Shapley value arises as the (unique efficient) semi-value SE P where p n s =
Example 4.3. Let N, v ∈ G. With every (yet unspecified) collection of nonnegative constants M = {m n s | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1}, there is associated the least square value LS M (N, v) to be defined as the unique optimal solution of the following optimization problem of which the objective function is given by the weighted sum of the square of the "excesses" of all non-trivial coalitions (the so-called least square problem, [5] , pages 113-114):
Ruiz et al. ([5] , Theorem 8, page 116) showed that the class of least square values is fully characterized by the following five properties: efficiency, linearity, symmetry, coalitional monotonicity, and inessential game property. As such, the least square family contains the additive efficient normalization of any semi-value. Particularly, it turns out that the Shapley value agrees with the least square value LS M whenever m n s = This proves that the B-scaled game N, B(ṽ B ) is inessential, that is the limit game N,ṽ B itself is B-inessential.
(ii) (3.11) is equivalent to (3.9) applied to a one-person coalition. Given (3.11), the proof of (3.12) proceeds by induction on t ≥ 1. In case t = 1, then (3.12) reduces toγ n·(n−1) for all j ∈ N \{i}, which equalities hold because of (3.10). So, (3.12) holds if t = 1. Suppose (3.12) holds for coalitions of size t − 1. We aim to prove (3.12) for any coalition T of size t, t ≥ 2. In case i ∈ T , γ {i} B (T ) 
Thus, (3.12) is valid in case i ∈ T , and similarly, the case i ∈ T is left to the reader. This completes the inductive proof of (3.12). In fact, (3.12) yields for all i ∈ N , and all S ⊆ N \{i}, This completes the proof of (3.13). 2
